

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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ENDC/PV.264  
14 June 1966  
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 14 June 1966, at 3 p.m.

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

OCT 11 1966

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

(Mexico)

cdc.66-483

66-18431

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. Azeredo da SILVEIRA  
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS  
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES  
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Barma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE  
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA  
Mr. G. O. OJO

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. B. KAJDY  
Mrs. M. COSMA-KOMPANIEJCEW

Romania:

Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. I. PAH

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. Y. M. VORONTOV  
Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN  
Mr. I. I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT  
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN  
Mr. P. W. J. BUXTON  
Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER  
Mr. G. BUNN  
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD  
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the two hundred and sixty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

First of all, I should like to give a warm welcome to Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira, the new representative of Brazil. Knowing his experience and wisdom, we are sure that he will continue the valuable contribution which Brazil has at all times made to the work of this Committee. Therefore, speaking as Chairman and as representative of Mexico, I extend to him a most cordial welcome.

Permit me now to make a statement as the representative of Mexico.

At the start of the recess which ends today, we parted in a mood of frustration and sadness -- I really cannot find more euphemistic terms. There was frustration because we had been unable to take a single step forward in carrying out effectively the tasks assigned to us, so inescapably, by the United Nations General Assembly. And there was sadness because, on the very eve of our leavetaking on 9 May, there took place in the Sinkiang Desert the third explosion by the fifth member of the nuclear pentarchy: the fifth to join, but the first for the size of its human population, far exceeding that of any of the other four, and even that of some of them put together.

Moreover, the characteristics of the explosion and its timing in relation to the two previous ones have made clear, in the month of reflection and pondering which followed the event, that apart from the human potential there is also an enormous technological and industrial potential in that country which is going rapidly through the stages, so lengthy formerly for others, between fission bomb and fusion bomb. Contrary to the optimistic calculations made at the beginning, which foresaw a period ranging from five to ten years, today the time does not seem far distant when in those immense spaces there will take place the fourth explosion, which will be at last a thermo-nuclear explosion, with the infinite capability of destruction possessed by the hydrogen bomb. It is indeed a very gloomy situation, charged with very dark forebodings for the future.

To all the foregoing, and to increase still more the anxiety and consternation, there must be added the consideration that, although the group of five nuclear Powers is usually called the "atomic club", it should not be forgotten that the simile is not altogether appropriate, because in every club there are certain rules of conduct or rules of the game which all its members observe. That unfortunately does not

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apply here. Neither the fourth nor the fifth member is in fact bound by such a basic rule of nuclear behaviour, so to speak, as that laid down by the Moscow Treaty on the partial banning of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The fifth member in its turn, the one responsible for the Sinkiang explosion, is not bound by any rule whatsoever, because of its exclusion from the United Nations, whose Charter embodies all the basic rules and principles of international co-existence. In relation to written law and the international social contract, that world Power is in a state of nature. I believe we can put the situation in this way, in this land of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and that this in itself is sufficient, without need for further stress, to make us see the gravity of the situation.

Those were, more or less, the thoughts that sobered us when we parted; and if today, on reassembling, we have revived them, it is not for any masochistic purpose but because they continue to be topical and because they are -- or at any rate should be -- an added incentive to us to accomplish the task which, with half the year already gone at our last session of the year, again confronts us with painful and ever-growing urgency.

Very little time remains -- three months and seven days to be exact -- before the United Nations General Assembly begins its deliberations. We shall then have to appear before that body to render a strict account of the triple mandate we have received from it (ENDC/161): (1) to make substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures; (A/RES/2031 (XX)); (2) to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments (A/RES/2032 (XX)); and (3) to conclude an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2028 (XX)). Those are the exact terms -- as you are well aware -- of the respective resolutions of the General Assembly.

Are we going to appear before it once again empty-handed, having been unable to fulfil even one of the items of this triple mandate? And in this gloomy hypothesis which the Mexican delegation wishes to prevent at all costs, is it not possible that the General Assembly will refuse to renew once again a mandate which has proved so unfruitful, and prefer to leave the whole question to diplomatic conversations rather than to the negotiating body?

(The Chairman, Mexico)

Not only in order to avert this gloomy possibility, but also because of the turn which world events are taking, symbolized by the explosion of 9 May, our task becomes all the more pressing. In the three months at our disposal we must make a supreme effort to attain the most urgent of all goals, which seems to be the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The imperative necessity for this treaty, precisely in the light of recent events, was stressed by Mr. McNamara in a statement which he made in Montreal on 18 May and which created a considerable stir. In the view of the United States Secretary of Defense, it is necessary -- so he said -- "to build bridges" between all the nuclear Powers without exception, so as to prevent the "isolation" which he described as "potentially catastrophic". The distinguished statesman went on to say: "If we seriously intend to pass on a world to our children that is not threatened by nuclear holocaust, we must come to grips with the problem of proliferation" (The New York Times, 19 May 1966, p.11). Thus there has never been greater need for a spirit of conciliation and mutual concessions on the part of all States -- nuclear and non-nuclear, aligned and non-aligned -- in order to overcome the various obstacles which have arisen from time to time during our debates and obstructed the path of negotiation.

In regard to the nuclear Powers and their allies, we repeat the hope that they will soon be able to arrive among themselves (since no solution can come from outside) at a conciliation between the needs of a military alliance on the one hand, and on the other the security which the members of the other alliance consider to be damaged or diminished by certain agreements concluded within the opposing bloc. So long as the present division of the great Powers and their allies into blocs based on alliances persists, both these requirements appear to us to be plausible and worthy of respect. However difficult it may be, we do not believe it impossible to harmonize them if first place is given, as it certainly must, to the supreme interests of mankind, which call for an end to be put as soon as possible and in one way or another to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In regard to the non-aligned Powers, the Mexican delegation considers that although we must at all times be careful to ensure that the non-proliferation treaty complies strictly with the directives laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) the urgency of the situation should perhaps induce us to interpret those directives or principles as liberally as possible, so that we in our turn do not create insuperable

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obstacles to the adoption of the treaty by the nuclear Powers. It must be recognized in fact that those principles, at least as far as their wording is concerned, are more formal than material, so that they nearly all lend themselves to a variety of interpretations, as has been shown by the discussions which have taken place here. This being so, the Mexican delegation will advocate the strictest interpretation as the firm desideratum, but sees no disadvantage in adopting a more flexible interpretation if at a particular moment this turns out to be the only one likely to achieve a general consensus and thus make possible the final conclusion of the treaty.

The only provision in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2028 which, in our opinion, is sufficiently categorical to rule out conflicting interpretations is (e), which reads:

"Nothing in the treaty "-- on non-proliferation --" should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order

to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories". Furthermore, we do not believe that this provision will give rise to any difficulties in the future; and as proof that up to the present time, even before a general treaty has been signed, this provision is being faithfully observed, I am happy to inform the Committee that the work already begun on the denuclearization of Latin America has proceeded without major obstacles. Indeed, denuclearization already exists, and this de facto situation will soon be given final juridical recognition in an appropriate legal instrument. This may be seen from the work accomplished by the Preparatory Commission, which held its third session in the capital of the Mexican Republic from 19 April to 4 May last. Summing up the situation in his closing speech, the Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, indicated that about 90 per cent of the proposals had been adopted at the session. He added that, although certain differences of opinion still remained, these would undoubtedly disappear, since, he himself said that the session --

"has stressed the absolute unanimity regarding the final goal which is ours ... and where there is a will there is a way".

It seems to me that this maxim can be aptly applied here and now among ourselves and in relation to ourselves. If we really wish, not with unstable velleity but with a firm and resolute will, for the treaty or treaties which it is our duty to conclude, we cannot do other than find, with goodwill and a spirit of compromise,

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the appropriate means to enable us to agree finally on a text which can be accepted by all. If I purposely speak of treaties in the plural, it is because the Mexican delegation continues to consider as equally urgent, together with the treaty on non-proliferation, the other treaty -- which would be an extension of the one at present in force -- on the banning of nuclear weapons tests in all environments.

This is not the time to go into further details, since we have already done so (ENDC/PV.246) and shall do so once again when a suitable occasion arises. I simply thought it useful, on the occasion of the resumption of our work, to stress once again the tremendous responsibility which rests upon us in view of the latest events which have had such a dramatic impact on the international situation. The Disarmament Committee can do much to remedy this situation. May this hope, once again voiced at the beginning of our session, at last be transformed into a happy reality in the three months of work which begin today.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First, may I join our Chairman in welcoming our new colleague, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira, to our Conference? I feel sure that with his distinguished diplomatic background he will be able to add much to our possibilities for success here. We are very happy to have him here.

Secondly, it is good to see so many of our former colleagues back again. I think that fact makes it clear that we can return to serious work immediately with the hope of early progress in our important tasks.

Thirdly, I should like to inform the Committee that Ambassador Timberlake, who has been my colleague here for the last two years, has been assigned to important new diplomatic tasks, in which I am sure we all wish him well. The new deputy chairman of the United States delegation is beside me. He is an old friend of most of the representatives -- Mr. George Bunn --, and I am very happy to have him with me again at this table.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that the enlightened statement you made today in opening our meeting is a good augury. Your interpretation of resolution 2028 (XX) deserves the close attention of all of us. The efforts which your country has made to create a nuclear-free zone in Latin America deserve the strong support of this Conference, and I hope that it will help you in the success of your efforts in this field.

Twenty years ago to this day -- on 14 June 1946 -- Bernard Baruch presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission a United States plan to dispose of all atomic bombs and prohibit their further production (AEC/PV.1). The atom was to be



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harnessed for peaceful purposes for all mankind. The manufacture of atomic bombs was to cease, and existing bombs were to be dismantled. In 1946 the United States was the only nuclear weapon Power in the world. We nevertheless thought that one such Power was too many. We believed that our national interests, and indeed the interests of all nations, would be best served by a world without the bomb. Had the Baruch plan been accepted, nuclear energy would have been removed entirely from the military field.

We shall gain little by speculating on what might have been. But let us heed Bernard Baruch's words of twenty years ago:

"We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead.  
That is our business.

"Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: we must elect world peace or world destruction."

(ibid. p.25-30)

The Baruch plan, subsequent disarmament plans, and attempts to halt nuclear testing, were blocked by objections to international control. But on 14 June 1957, nine years ago today, the Soviet Union agreed for the first time to the exercise of international control over a prohibition on nuclear weapon tests. Its proposal to the United Nations Disarmament Commission reads in part:

"Considering that the problem of control over the cessation of these tests is now being advanced as the main obstacle to the attainment of an agreement on this matter the Soviet Government, with a view to removing that obstacle, expresses its agreement to the institution of control over the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests." (DC/SC.1/60)

As we all know, agreement on the nature of the international control arrangements could not be reached in the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban which began in 1958. In 1962 the United States offered a limited test ban which could be monitored by national controls. The 1963 Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) banning tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space resulted. However, a ban on underground tests has not been possible, because the Soviet Union has reverted to its earlier view that only national control systems are needed. My Government remains strongly committed to completing the limited test-ban treaty by a ban on underground nuclear testing. Despite the substantial progress which science has made, hard evidence still points to the need for on-site inspection in order to verify a comprehensive test ban.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Before the recess my delegation described scientific techniques which might be utilized to simplify on-site inspection (ENDC/PV.254, pp.16 et seq.). We would welcome further comment from other delegations. United Nations General Assembly resolution 2032 (XX) (ENDC/161) specifically requested this Committee to take account in its work of improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection. Recalling this, we are encouraged by signs of heightened interest by many countries in establishing such co-operation and in exchanging seismic data. We have noted with special interest the meeting held in Stockholm last month at the initiative of the Swedish Government as a follow-up to its proposal for a seismic "detection club". We understand that the agreed aim of the "club" should be to arrive at an efficient and open exchange of high-quality seismic data. On the occasion of the inauguration last year of a new large-aperture seismic array in Montana, President Johnson announced that the seismic data from that array would be freely available to all countries.

We hope that international co-operation on collection and exchange of seismic data, and a continuing search towards improved detection and identification technology, will contribute to agreement on a comprehensive test ban. The Soviet Union could make a major contribution by returning to its earlier view that national control systems are not alone sufficient to monitor a ban on all tests. While the Soviet Government now takes the position that national systems are adequate, it has not submitted any technical data to support such a position, despite repeated requests. The world is weary of Soviet contentions that inspection would always constitute espionage.

A treaty banning underground tests could go hand in hand with a treaty banning proliferation, if we could overcome the differences on both which now prevent agreement. But time is running out. The world does not stand still while we debate. We have only to recall the third nuclear test conducted by mainland China, to which our Chairman referred and which took place in the closing days of the first half of our session. In the interim there has also been renewed speculation in the world Press on whether or not nuclear weapons might be developed in other countries and in other regions.

Agreement on a non-proliferation treaty will continue to be impeded as long as preoccupation with short-term objectives obscures the true nature and dimensions of the real problem over the long term. We must look beyond the immediate future:

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we must not be obsessed with any one country but concerned rather with the global aspects of the nuclear threat. To the extent that certain among us profess to fear for their security unless the alleged nuclear ambitions of another are contained, they must ask themselves whether in these circumstances they can be more comfortable and secure looking to a future with no bar to proliferation at all; for the alternative to prevention of nuclear spread is not a world with one or two new nuclear-weapon States in, say, five years, but rather a world with perhaps ten new nuclear-weapon States in ten to twenty years from now. That is the real dimension of the problem, the real threat.

We cannot be so short-sighted as to negotiate for today alone, with only today's problems in mind. We must try to build a safer, more peaceful world for the future. There comes a time, therefore, if we are to have agreement, when we must reconcile our differences and our rivalries and work together for what we recognize to be the common good. That time has come.

Before the recess the United States submitted draft treaty amendments (ENDC/152/Add.1) designed to meet suggestions by other delegations. We reviewed General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164), and the comments on our earlier draft (ENDC/152) made by others. We suggest a similar review by the Soviet Union. The difference between the two sides will not be bridged if the movement comes from only one.

Whatever may be the final language, we must have an effective treaty. It can have no loop-holes permitting the spread of nuclear weapons. But we must be prepared for the possibility that it may not be perfect for all time. Few treaties are. If experience reveals problems that were not apparent at the time of drafting, then we can deal with them under procedures that can be built into the treaty.

The treaty must reflect balance in terms of mutual obligations and responsibilities assumed. But what is balance, and can it be perfect in today's world? We must be realistic in terms of what is both possible and necessary for an effective treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

In his final words to this Committee on 10 May, just before we recessed, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, indicated that the discussions within the Committee during the first part of our session had not been, as he put it, "altogether useless" (ENDC/PV.263, p.29). In the context in which the phrase was used, we took it to be a positive sign. We share Mr. Roshchin's view that our earlier

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discussions permitted positions to be better defined and reasons for divergencies to be better ascertained. We hope, as he did, that new steps can now be taken to resolve the impasse on the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. We also support Mr. Roshchin's assessment that, during the first part of our session, "proposals have been put forward which are of definite interest and deserve careful study". (*ibid.*). We hope that he meant to include certain United States proposals in this broad reference, notwithstanding the initial Soviet reactions.

In addition to the test-ban and non-proliferation treaty proposals to which I have already referred, the United States has submitted to this Committee two working papers related to a cut-off of fissionable material production for weapon purposes. One (ENDC/172) described methods for demonstrating the destruction of nuclear weapons to produce fissionable material for peaceful purposes in connexion with the cut-off. The other (ENDC/174) outlined an inspection method for verifying the status of shutdown plutonium production reactors. The production cut-off and weapon destruction proposals would be highly germane to our non-proliferation objectives, as the representative of Sweden has pointed out (ENDC/PV.243, p.10). Moreover, the problem of verification should be far simpler to resolve in this case, since some international machinery is already available to help. I refer, of course, to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

My delegation invites detailed comment on our two working papers, as well as on our general proposals for a cut-off and destruction. The elimination of all nuclear weapons from national arsenals in the context of general and complete disarmament remains our ultimate objective. We have said before that we question the realism of pretending to make it an immediate, short-term goal, which has sometimes seemed to be the position of the Soviet Union. A cut-off, however, is practical and possible today. It is an essential first step towards reduction of nuclear stockpiles and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It deserves thorough study, in the first instance, by the Soviet Union.

A United States proposal for a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is also before this Committee (ENDC/120). Moreover, we have recently stated that if progress could be made towards a freeze we should be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/165). Here

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again, unless we can first agree on ways to halt the build-up of nuclear delivery vehicles and perhaps begin to reduce their numbers, it is difficult to take seriously any counter-proposal for their total elimination.

We are proposing to halt the nuclear arms race. We are proposing to begin the nuclear disarmament which the world has awaited so long. We think that our measures are realistic. They could be agreed upon rapidly. The stakes involved are such that this Committee would be remiss if it did not explore the potential of these measures fully and with good will.

Another useful suggestion that warrants greater attention by this Committee is point seven of President Johnson's message of 27 January to this Committee (ibid.). President Johnson suggested, it will be recalled, that countries might explore on a regional basis ways of halting costly conventional arms races. The Committee will recall our elaboration of this suggestion in my statement of 19 April (ENDC/PV.257, pp. 17 et seq.). This United States suggestion stems from the awareness that conventional arms races threaten the peace in many regions of the world. They divert precious resources needed for the betterment of economies and the welfare of peoples.

This is not a measure which the United States or this Committee can bring about. Regional arms limitations can be agreed only upon the initiative of, and under conditions worked out by, the countries of a given region. Yet in this Committee representatives of countries in regions where mutually-agreed limitations on conventional arms might contribute to stability and peace could agree to explore the potentials of the approach which we suggest. The Committee as a whole might wish to make the suggestion its own and commend it to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Members of the Committee which, like the United States, are suppliers of arms could encourage this suggestion by giving strong support and signifying readiness to respect regional agreements on limitation of conventional armaments.

These are the problems to which we wished to call the Committee's special attention today. Can progress be made on these and others in the weeks now remaining before us? It can be if the will is here. The forum at our disposal -- this Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee -- is tailored to that particular task. We claim to be a negotiating body. Then let us really negotiate. But let us negotiate quickly.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

In 1963 an historic step was realized. The limited test-ban Treaty was concluded; and, as we all know, other important steps were taken. Those measures constituted a fundamental change of direction from the hazards of a completely unguided arms race in this nuclear age. They proved that, with patience, goodwill and imagination, agreement could be achieved for the common benefit. However, we have barely begun to turn in a different direction. We are not yet firmly on the path of international agreements in the common interest towards making the world safe from the threat of cataclysmic nuclear war, towards a world free from the daily grinding tragedies inflicted by wars of indirect aggression and subversion, a place where men and women around the globe can pursue their ways of life without the heavy burdens of armaments and wars.

Our work here is as important as any in the world in helping to move forward towards the realization of those goals. My delegation is determined to bend every effort towards resuming the forward movement which we began in 1963. We urge every delegation to consider seriously and with good will the new proposals which we advanced before the recess. We urge them to give us their comments, to suggest alternative solutions and approaches. If our crucial work can proceed in this fashion, the United States will never be found lacking in constructive contributions.

Mr. ROSHCIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We should like to take this opportunity to associate our delegation with the welcome which you, Mr. Chairman, have extended to the newly-appointed representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira. We too wish him every success in his new post and in his new activities as our colleague in the work of the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, we have listened with due attention to your statement, as also to the statement made by the representative of the United States. We shall in due course state our views in the fullest possible way on the questions which have been touched upon in your own statement and in that of the representative of the United States. We intend also in our intervention today to deal with some of the questions which have been raised both in your statement, Mr. Chairman, and in that of the representative of the United States, and to give some explanation of our position in regard to them.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

At present, without going into the details of the statement of the representative of the United States, we must state in a very general way that, on a number of very important points to which the United States representative has drawn the attention of the Committee, we are unable to share the opinion expressed by him.

Thus the representative of the United States referred today to the date of 14 June, which marks the twentieth anniversary of the presentation of the "Baruch Plan" in the United Nations (AEC/PV.1). The representative of the United States pointed out that the aim of this plan was to eliminate atomic weapons, to eliminate them even though at that time there was only one atomic Power. In this connexion we should like to observe that our assessment of the "Baruch Plan", which we gave twenty years ago and which we have also dealt with in our statements here, emphasized that we do not share the opinion that the "Baruch Plan" pursued the aim of eliminating atomic weapons. We stated, and we must repeat here once again, that we believe that the "Baruch Plan" pursued the aim of keeping the monopoly of atomic weapons in the hands of the United States. In this connexion we submitted on 19 June 1946, five days after the presentation of the "Baruch Plan", a proposal for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, for the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and for the prohibition of the production, storage, transport and use of such weapons (AEC/PV.2, pp. 65 et seq.). Twenty years after that event we cannot, of course, but regret that that very important proposal of the Soviet Union was not accepted.

At present we are dealing with problems closely connected with the aim of eliminating nuclear weapons, and it is to this subject that we are also devoting our statement today. As I have already said, we shall give an appropriate answer also in our statement today to a number of other questions touched upon by the representative of the United States.

Today after a month's recess the Eighteen-Nation Committee is resuming its work. It faces the same tasks as those at which it worked before the recess -- the preparation of agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of underground nuclear tests; limitation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race; and lastly, a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

In comparing the international situation in which the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee is beginning its work with that in which the work of the

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previous session was conducted, we have to note with regret the absence of any change in a positive direction. The disarmament negotiations are being resumed in circumstances where the international situation has not only not improved since the end of the previous session of the Committee but has become even more tense. The United States of America continues to follow a course set at interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples, at creating dangerous centres of conflict and unrest in one or another area of the world, and is carrying out a policy aimed at further intensifying the arms race.

It is impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact the United States of America is waging on an ever more extensive scale a war of aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and against the whole of the Viet-Nameese people. At the same time as the Disarmament Committee resumes its work here in Geneva, more and more ships with further destructive means of warfare and troops from the United States are arriving at the coasts of Viet-Nam. The number of United States troops in Viet-Nam already amounts to about 270,000 and within the next one-and-a-half months, according to official announcements in the United States, it will increase still further. United States divisions, aircraft carriers, powerful bombers, poison gases and napalm -- all these are being hurled against the small but freedom-loving Viet-Nameese people, whose only desire is that no one should interfere in their internal affairs and that their right to decide their own future should be respected.

The echo of the war in Viet-Nam, the thunder of the bombings to which United States aircraft are subjecting the territory of an independent, sovereign State -- the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam -- resounds throughout the world. United States aggression is being condemned ever more severely in all countries of the world, and the protest movement is growing even in the United States itself. The Soviet Union, together with all peace-loving peoples, demands the cessation of United States aggression against Viet-Nam and the withdrawal of all interventionist troops from that country.

The unceasing provocative acts of the United States against the Republic of Cuba are also causing serious alarm. The recent hostile actions by United States troops against the Republic of Cuba in the area of the Guantanamo military base have confirmed once again that the United States is carrying out in that part of the world a policy aimed at intensifying international tension and creating a danger to world peace.



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A tense situation is also to be seen in Europe. In the present circumstances the problems of ensuring European security are becoming increasingly important. Here, in the very centre of the continent of Europe, there exists a hotbed of a serious danger of war. The threat to peace stems from West Germany, which with the support of the United States of America is going ever further along the path of the rebirth of militarism and revanchism. Today, little more than two decades since the end of the Second World War, West Germany, in violation of the Potsdam Agreements, has built up an army of half a million men, which is equipped with modern means of warfare.

The Federal Republic of Germany is the only State in Europe that has openly expressed itself in favour of re-drawing the borders between European countries. In essence the whole European policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is a striving to make the peaceful life and security of the European peoples depend upon the satisfaction of the unreasonable claims of the West German revanchists. The attempts of West Germany to secure access to nuclear weapons by any means whatsoever are a particular menace to security in Europe and to world peace. For a number of years the training and technical equipment of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany have been carried out with due regard to the use of nuclear weapons. The Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. von Hassel, in a foreword to a book on the role of the Bundeswehr, wrote recently that the West German Army should possess technical equipment and weapons not inferior to the technical equipment and weapons of a "potential enemy". Does that not mean that the aim is to possess nuclear bombs?

It is precisely with a view to obtaining access to nuclear weapons that the Government of West Germany continues so persistently to strive for the establishment in one form or another of a NATO joint nuclear force. It is quite obvious that, by pursuing a policy aimed at securing West Germany's access to nuclear weapons, the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany and those who support them are preventing the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; since it is clear that the nuclear arming of the Federal Republic of Germany, in whatever form it may be planned, would be incompatible with such a treaty.

The policy of militarism and revanchism pursued by West Germany and the bilateral military alliance that is taking shape between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany seriously complicate the international situation

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and increase the danger of war. It is impossible not to realize that a conflict in Europe, where the armed forces of the NATO countries and those of the Warsaw Pact countries face each other, would be fraught with the danger of a world thermo-nuclear war with all the consequences arising therefrom.

The solution of the most important international problems -- the cessation of United States aggression in Viet-Nam and the ensuring of European security -- would change the whole situation in the world and would thereby facilitate the achievement of other aims of importance to all the peoples of the world, such as the cessation of the arms race, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and controlled general disarmament.

The whole international situation cannot fail to affect the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The forces responsible for the acts of aggression that are being perpetrated in the world and for the intensification of the arms race also bear the responsibility for the lack of progress in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In this situation more tense than ever before, it is important to exert every effort to put a brake on and stop the dangerous process of increased international tension, and to slow down and halt the accelerating arms race. In the situation that has come about the Eighteen-Nation Committee faces a highly responsible task: to achieve in the negotiations ahead a solution to the urgent problems of disarmament.

A particularly important task in the field of disarmament is the elimination, or at least the reduction, of the danger of a nuclear war. A radical solution of this problem would be the implementation of complete nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union is altogether in favour of such a solution of this problem. Our position is clear and specific: we are in favour of the unconditional prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons, together with the cessation of production of such weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles. That proposal, as I mentioned just now, was first made on 19 June 1946. We are prepared to accept such a solution of this problem. We are also prepared to accept the implementation of individual measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and the slowing-down of the nuclear arms race.

Among these measures the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons occupies a very important place. One would have thought that this problem should and could have been solved long ago. However, by the efforts of the United States

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of America and the Federal Republic of Germany obstacles have been placed in the way of a solution to this problem which, as events have shown, have proved very difficult to overcome. One obstacle to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the fact that the United States of America is striving to secure a situation in which the claim of the Federal Republic of Germany to have access to nuclear weapons would be satisfied. The draft treaty on non-proliferation (ENDC/152 and Add.1) submitted by the United States of America is drafted precisely in such a way, and consequently does not at all correspond to the aim set by the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly in this regard.

Mr. Foster today referred to the fact that the United States first submitted one draft to the twentieth session and then, last March, submitted an amended draft. But both drafts reflect essentially one and the same position. In the new draft there is no essential change in the position. Consequently the plea that the United States has submitted a new draft and is thus dispensed, as it were, from the need to do anything more in the way of submitting new proposals that would eliminate the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is without any weight or validity. The United States draft cannot be taken as a basis for drafting a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, since that draft, including the amendments, is not aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and is based on the idea of a limited proliferation of such weapons.

The United States draft treaty on non-proliferation by no means forbids a nuclear Power to transfer nuclear weapons into the possession of a non-nuclear country. It imposes on non-nuclear countries only one limitation, namely to use nuclear weapons by agreement with an existing nuclear-weapon State. The position of the United States in regard to non-proliferation quite obviously shows that it does not wish to conclude a treaty that would prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would correspond in this regard to the recommendations of the General Assembly on this subject.

The Soviet Union is very much interested in an immediate and positive solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. The proliferation of such weapons constitutes a great danger to world peace and to the security of all peoples. In this connexion it is particularly necessary to stress the serious threat to peace in

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Europe and throughout the world which is entailed in the plan for the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, which is being supported by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, and in plans for the establishment of any other NATO nuclear forces.

The Soviet Union's draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/164), which is before the Committee, precludes the possibility of any loop-holes for direct or indirect proliferation of such weapons. It is important to note that during the consideration of the Soviet draft treaty in the Committee not a single representative in the Committee, not excluding the representative of the United States, put forward any objection to this draft on the ground that it fails to establish the necessary guarantees against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. The main objections of the United States and its Western partners to the Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation took the line that the draft is aimed at disrupting the NATO military bloc of the Western Powers. In such an interpretation of the position and proposals of the Soviet Union in regard to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons there is, of course, not even a shred of truth. The Soviet draft prevents only the proliferation of nuclear weapons through military alliances, such as NATO, and does not affect these alliances in any other respect.

The Soviet Union believes that the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons can and must be solved in strict conformity with the recommendations of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly on this subject (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161). We are prepared to exert every effort to achieve such a solution.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the solution of another problem connected with slowing down the arms race: the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests. Concern is increasing daily in the world because continuing nuclear tests are a means of improving weapons of mass destruction and creating even more devastating types of these weapons.

All the conditions are now present -- and this can hardly be denied -- for the speediest achievement of an agreement to ban underground nuclear explosions. The guarantee that an agreement on this subject would be strictly observed is the fact that at the present time there are reliable means of detecting and identifying underground nuclear weapon tests. Anyone who ventured in a secret and deceptive way to violate the agreement on this subject would be caught in the act and exposed.

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It is difficult to imagine that, faced with the possibility of such an exposure, any government would venture to violate the agreement reached on this question.

However, despite the ardent wish of the overwhelming majority of the peoples and governments of the countries of the world, an agreement banning underground nuclear tests still remains an unrealizable desire. It is being frustrated on account of the unwarranted demands of the Western Powers for the establishment of a system of international control and inspection over the prohibition of nuclear tests. It becomes even more obvious that these demands are put forward by the United States in order to prevent the achievement of an agreement to put an end to underground nuclear tests, so that the United States can keep its hands free to continue dangerous experiments with nuclear weapons.

It would not be out of place to recall that the United States is displaying particular activity in carrying out underground tests. This year alone the United States has announced 24 underground nuclear explosions -- that is, one explosion a week -- ; and altogether, since the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was signed, according to statements in the American press the United States has carried out 92 underground tests. We have already noted at the last session -- and this has been confirmed in the last report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission -- that in the United States extensive plans have been worked out and adopted for carrying out underground nuclear tests in the next few years.

Articles have appeared in the American press which show that the United States is carrying out nuclear tests and developing at the Atomic Energy Commission's proving grounds in Nevada "a new generation of warheads". As an official from the United States Atomic Energy Commission has stated, the new generation of atomic weapons which are being tested in the territory of the United States makes the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki look like "innocent toys".

The achievement of an agreement banning underground nuclear weapon tests would be an important contribution to the cause of disarmament. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to help in every way to bring this about.

Besides the problems I have already mentioned, there are many others whose solution would halt, or in any case slow down, the arms race in the field of conventional and nuclear weapons and would help towards a relaxation of international tension.

Further efforts are required in order to break the deadlock on the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. So far the recommendations of the sixteenth

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session of the United Nations General Assembly providing for the convening of a special conference to sign an agreement on this question (A/RES/1653 (XVI)) have not been put into effect. In order to help towards solving this problem, the Soviet Union has proposed that States possessing nuclear weapons should assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (ENDC/167, p.3). The Committee should resume its efforts to achieve a positive solution of this problem.

The question of the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries still awaits solution. There is a resolution of the General Assembly, adopted at its twentieth session, calling for the elimination of foreign military bases on colonial territories (A/RES/2105(XX)). Solution of the whole problem of the withdrawal of foreign troops and armaments from the territories of other countries would be of enormous significance for bringing about a radical improvement in the international situation and normalization of the state of affairs in the world.

The question of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world has still to be solved. The Committee has before it many other problems relating to collateral measures in the field of disarmament and requiring immediate steps for their solution.

In speaking of collateral measures in the field of disarmament, one must always bear in mind the solution of the most important problem -- general and complete disarmament. As events develop and the weapons of war become more sophisticated, the importance of this problem increases rather than decreases. The problem of general and complete disarmament must be the basic programme of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In this connexion we can refer to the resolution of the twentieth session of the General Assembly which requests our Committee to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament (A/RES/2031(XX); ENDC/161).

The twenty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations will open in September. By then a very wide range of questions should have been examined by the Committee. As a result of this examination there should be definite positive solutions of disarmament questions, or at least definite positive progress in solving these problems. The past session of the Committee unfortunately had no positive solutions of disarmament questions to show on the credit side of its balance sheet. This fact lays a particular responsibility upon the current session. The Committee

cannot and must not go empty-handed to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. Great efforts and readiness to solve the problems of disarmament are necessary. The Soviet delegation will make every effort to achieve agreement on these matters. It believes that the Committee should find mutually-acceptable ways of solving the disarmament questions before it, and should prepare concrete proposals and recommendations.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I must express my deep regret that the representative of the Soviet Union has chosen to open our discussions here with a propaganda blast. I cannot see how it can contribute in any way to the serious business of this Conference. We have stated time and again the basic and essential fact that South Viet-Nam is being subjected to armed attack by Communist North Viet-Nam. We are in South Viet-Nam to repel that aggression. We are there to help to assure the South Viet-Namese people the basic right to decide their own future. We are there to help them achieve a better standard of living for themselves and for their children. We are there to help establish the principle that in this nuclear age aggression cannot be an acceptable means of settling international disputes or of realizing national objectives.

But, above all else, I think it is clear to the world that we want peace in Viet-Nam. There can be no doubt of the overriding desire of the United States to find a peaceful solution that will safeguard the interests of the people of Viet-Nam. We have undertaken many initiatives in this direction. All of them have been thwarted by Hanoi and by Communist China. Clearly the question of peace in Viet-Nam rests in the hands of the leaders in Hanoi and those who support them.

If the Soviet Union is truly concerned over the conflict in Viet-Nam, if it has an interest in a peaceful settlement, then it should urge Hanoi to cease its invasion of the South. This would better serve the cause of peace than instructions to Soviet representatives at international conferences to repeat a stale ideological line which fits neither the facts nor the world's need for peace in South-East Asia.

The Soviet representative has once more attempted to raise doubts about the attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to non-proliferation. If there are really any doubts on this score, I should like to lay them to rest. I apologize to this Committee for again going through the same set of facts with which all representatives are familiar. The leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany have emphatically denied that they seek nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany is the only nation which has voluntarily pledged itself not to manufacture nuclear weapons, and it has stated its support of the principle of non-proliferation.

To demonstrate that, let me read from the joint communiqué of 21 December 1965 by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard:

"The Chancellor emphasized that the Federal Republic of Germany neither intended nor desired to acquire national control over nuclear weapons, that it had in 1954 given an undertaking to its allies not to produce such weapons in Germany and that, finally, it is the only State in the world to have subjected itself to international supervision of such an obligation. The President and the Chancellor were in agreement in upholding the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons into the national control of States. They were of the view that alliance nuclear arrangements would not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons and in fact should contribute to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. They stressed the importance of continuing efforts to reduce the threat of war and bring about an effective arms control".

In his press statement in February of this year Chancellor Erhard stated:

"I would like to repeat here explicitly and unmistakably that the Federal Government does not raise any claim to obtain nuclear weapons under national control, as well as that the Federal Government sticks to her repeatedly-stated solemn obligation that she on her part renounces the production of A, B, C weapons." Those are not the words of a revanchist, or revenge-seeker; they are the words of a man properly concerned with the security of his own people and with the interests of his neighbours.

In our discussions let us deal with facts instead of fancies. The fact is, not that Germany has a special privilege or a special nuclear ambition, but that it faces a special danger, the danger of hundreds of nuclear weapons targetted upon it. Those who cite past history in order to dramatize present risks must also recognize that the menace of very recent history compelled the establishment of NATO and requires its continued strong existence.

With regard to one other item, that of nuclear tests, it is somewhat ironical for the Soviet representative to attack the number of tests and the size of the explosions carried out underground by the United States. I need only remind my colleagues of the Soviet series of atmospheric tests less than five years ago, in the autumn of 1961. Need more be said?

Finally, if the Soviet representative is really concerned about halting the spread of nuclear weapons or about stopping underground tests, let him seek a change in the position of his Government. As I said earlier, the differences between us cannot be eliminated solely by the efforts of one side.

Mr. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) (translation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I am going to take the liberty of speaking in your beautiful language in order to thank you most sincerely for your kind words of welcome. It is particularly



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gratifying that this welcome in the Committee should have been extended to me in the first place by the representative of a country like Mexico, to which we Brazilians feel bound by brotherly ties of friendship and co-operation. I should also like to thank the representatives of the United States of America and the Soviet Union for their words of welcome, and to assure all representatives that Brazil will continue to work in this Committee with faith, hope and determination.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I will now read out a communication from our two co-Chairmen indicating the procedure to be followed in our future meetings:

(continued in English)

"The co-Chairmen have agreed to recommend to the members of the Committee the following schedule. The Committee could for the present continue, as before the recess, to hold two plenary meetings a week, on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 10.30 a.m. The first two or more meetings should be devoted to general statements, after which two meetings should be devoted to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, two meetings to other collateral measures, and one or two meetings to the question of general and complete disarmament. This proposal is not intended to interfere with the recognized right of any delegation to speak on any subject at any plenary meeting of the Committee."

(continued in Spanish)

If there are no objections, I shall take it that the statement of the two co-Chairmen meets with the approval of the Committee.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 264th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Antonio Gomez Robledo, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, the United States, the Soviet Union and Brazil.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 June 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.

